Social identification and gender-related ideology in women and men

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The nature of women’s and men’s gender-derived social identification was examined with a focus on the relationships between aspects of identity and gender-related ideology. Measures of social identification, sex-role ideology, and the perception of women’s collective disadvantage were completed by 171 women and 91 men who categorized themselves as either traditional, non-traditional or feminist. Factor analysis provided support for a multidimensional conception of gender-derived social identification, with viable subscales reflecting in-group ties, cognitive centrality, and in-group affect. For self-identified non-traditional and feminist women, the cognitive centrality of gender was greater, and more consistently related to gender-related ideology, than for traditional women. Traditional men reported stronger in-group ties and more positive gender-linked affect than did non-traditional men, but men’s levels of identification were generally weakly related to gender-related ideology. The utility of considering both multiple dimensions and ideological correlates of group identification is discussed with reference to social identity theory.

In the vast literature on sex and gender, several approaches have found it useful to regard women and men as members of social categories (e.g. Deaux, 1984; Deaux & Major, 1987; Sherif, 1982). While this is intuitively obvious, as most people rather easily recognize themselves and others as either male or female, there is a number of features that makes gender an important social categorization. For example, gender stereotypes are pervasive, and carry relatively well-defined prescriptions for typical male and female behaviour (Fiske & Stevens, 1993). Furthermore, gender is associated with deeply entrenched power and status differentials; that is, in terms of a variety of social, political and economic outcomes, men can be regarded as the more advantaged group. For this reason, just as there have been parallels drawn between sexism and racism, women have been viewed as occupying a disadvantaged position comparable with that of minority racial groups (Reid, 1988). Thus, despite the fact that members of each sex have considerable interpersonal contact with each other, there is an important intergroup dimension underlying gender relations (Abrams, 1989; Ashmore & Del Boca, 1986; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Sherif, 1982; Williams, 1984; Williams & Giles, 1978).

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Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) provides a general framework for describing the dynamics of group membership and behaviour. Although several recent studies have suggested that the theory may be usefully employed with respect to gender relations (e.g. Abrams, Thomas, & Hogg, 1990; Amancio, 1989; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996; Lindeman & Sundvik, 1995), many applications have failed to capture both the affective and ideological contours of sex-category membership. It is this limitation that the present study was conducted to address.

Social identity theory

According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), the self-concept is comprised of both personal and social identity, with social identity being ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Because group membership contributes to self-conception and (presumably) to self-esteem, the individual is motivated to maintain a positive social identity by engaging in social comparisons that preserve the favourability and distinctiveness of the in-group relative to relevant out-groups. If social comparisons result in a negative social identity (e.g. because of low status in the intergroup hierarchy) then, according to Tajfel and Turner (1979), individuals may adopt a number of strategies. Briefly, these are: social mobility (e.g. ‘passing’ into the high status group), social creativity (e.g. engaging in social comparison on dimensions favourable to the in-group) and social competition (e.g. direct attempts to elevate the status of the in-group). The choice of strategy will depend on an individual’s subjective beliefs about the nature of the intergroup context. For example, if the individual believes that the status differences are legitimate, a positive social identity can be achieved by focusing on individual achievement (i.e. social mobility). However, if the status hierarchy is perceived as illegitimate and unstable, low-status group members might endorse collective challenges to the status quo (i.e. social competition). Given that features of the strategy of social competition are inherent in feminist critiques of existing social arrangements, a number of researchers have viewed social identity theory as a potentially useful framework within which to analyse contemporary gender-related attitudes and behaviour, particularly those of women (e.g. Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Skevington & Baker, 1989; Williams & Giles, 1978).

Gender and social identity

The issues regarding the content and experience of gender identity are more complex than social identity research has generally acknowledged (Abrams, 1989; Condor, 1986; Skevington & Baker, 1989; Williams, 1984). Two issues provide the focus of the present study: (1) the multidimensional nature of social identification, and (2) the ideological correlates of gender-derived social identification.
Components of identification. It is now commonplace in the social identity literature to assess individual differences in group identification, with most investigations utilizing scales based on the 10-item measure developed by Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, and Williams (1986). Moreover, there is agreement that social identification is appropriately regarded as a multidimensional construct that incorporates both cognitive and affective elements (cf. Tajfel’s definition cited previously; see Brown et al., 1986; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989). Indeed, Hinkle et al. (1989) found some support for such a conception. However, factor analyses by various authors involving a number of intergroup contexts have also yielded factors that simply correspond to item directionality (Brown et al., 1986; Kelly, 1988), or found no evidence of distinct cognitive and affective components (Karasawa, 1991). Given the equivocal nature of these findings, the Brown et al. (1986) scale is generally treated as unidimensional.

With respect to gender, recent studies by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) and Lindeman (1997) employed versions of Brown et al.’s (1986) scale to assess global social identification; however, there is some precedent for viewing gender-related identity in multidimensional terms. For example, Gurin and Townsend (1986) specified, on an a priori basis, three components of women’s identity: perceived similarity to other women, the perception of common fate (i.e. a belief that women are treated similarly based on their group membership), and centrality of group membership to the self (cf. Converse, 1970). Cognitive centrality was operationalized as the amount of time in everyday life spent thinking about being a woman.

One purpose of the present study is to examine the dimensional attributes of gender-derived social identification, using an augmented set of items derived from the social identity literature (e.g. Brown et al., 1986; Hinkle et al., 1989), from studies of women’s social identity (Gurin & Markus, 1989; Gurin & Townsend, 1986), and from the measurement of collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

Identification and ideology. An intriguing complication of contemporary Western gender-related identity is that it can be derived not only from sex-category membership per se, but from attitudes and beliefs regarding sex roles and the nature of gender relations. For example, a woman might identify herself as ‘traditional’, or ‘non-traditional’, or ‘feminist’, depending on her beliefs regarding sex-appropriate roles and the nature of group relations between women and men. Because a feminist orientation represents a challenge to the (collective) status quo, applications of social identity theory to gender relations often contain the assumption that feminist women are more strongly gender-identified than more traditional women (e.g. Williams & Giles, 1978), and indeed there is empirical support for this (e.g. Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). However, the notion of a necessary link between identification and social-change orientation has been criticized (e.g. Condor, 1986) in light of research indicating that traditional women also can exhibit strong attachment to their gender group (Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994; Condor, 1986).

In summary, there does not appear to be a simple relationship between group identification and gender-related ideology. Two possibilities were examined in the present study. First, if social identification is treated as a multidimensional
construct, then there is evidence to suggest that some components will be more strongly associated with gender-related ideology than others. For example, in a national survey of American women, Gurin and Townsend (1986) found that a sense of common fate was strongly predictive of gender consciousness (e.g. collective discontent), whereas perceived similarity to other women was not. Secondly, the ideological meaning of gender-derived social identification might vary for different groups of women and men. In support of this idea, Gurin and Markus (1989) reported that the cognitive centrality of gender was positively related to feminist consciousness only for women with a non-traditional role-orientation; indeed, these variables were negatively associated for traditional women. Although Gurin and Markus categorized women into traditional and non-traditional categories based on their responses to sex-role attitude items, subjective self-identification may also be important; considering the increasing prominence of gender politics in both public and private life, whether one chooses (or distances oneself from) labels such as ‘traditional’ or ‘feminist’ is a matter of some social-psychological consequence. For example, Henderson-King and Stewart (1994) found that women’s levels of group consciousness were more strongly related to their identification with ‘feminists’ than to their identification with ‘women’.

An additional goal of this study is to address the social identity of men, given that virtually all of the relevant research has focused on women. Although social identity theory is particularly suited to examining the identity and behaviour of low-status group members, it also suggests that high-status group members will be motivated to preserve their dominance if they perceive it to be legitimate (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, a parallel analysis of men might be equally important to understand psychological processes that facilitate or deter social change (e.g. Kimmel, 1987). Although there is some evidence that individual-difference variables such as authoritarianism (Haddock & Zanna, 1994) predict men’s attitudes toward women, few investigations have explicitly addressed the nature of men’s social identification in relation to gender-related beliefs. Indirect evidence, however, suggests that traditional men exhibit stronger identification than non-traditional men (Abrams, 1989). In one relevant study, Thomas (1990) used a Q-sort methodology to investigate men’s gender identity and gender ideology, and found that the ‘pro-feminist’ attitudinal profiles were characterized by a rejection of masculinity in terms of both self-definition and cultural stereotypes. This suggests that non-traditional men identify less strongly with their gender, although men’s accounts of their identity were generally uninformed by the political dimensions of gender relations and were more often characterized by a preoccupation with personal masculinity.

The present study. In summary, the present study was conducted to investigate the relationships among social identification and gender-related ideology in both men and women. Additionally, a measure of gender-derived social identification was developed to explore the viability of a multidimensional conception of this construct. Gender-related ideology was operationalized in terms of two variables: (1) sex-role ideology, as assessed by the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS;
Spence & Helmreich, 1978), and (2) the perception of women’s social disadvantage. The latter variable reflects an important feature of group consciousness for women, given that an awareness of collective inequality underlies a critique of existing relations between the sexes (e.g. see Gurin & Townsend, 1986).

The design of this study was guided by the assumption that within-sex self-categorizations inform the relationship between social identity and gender-related beliefs. An important issue, then, is determining which categories will provide an appropriate analytic scheme. One possibility is the traditional/non-traditional distinction used by Gurin and Markus (1989), which they operationalized in terms of variations in sex-role beliefs. Such beliefs, however, are incompletely reflective of perceptions of the illegitimacy of the intergroup status structure, which according to social identity theory are important precursors of collective and social-change-oriented strategies among lower-status group members. Recent work on contemporary forms of gender-related beliefs indicates, for example, that men and women who endorse non-traditional sex roles would not necessarily agree that existing structural relations between the sexes are illegitimate, or, relatedly, that women comprise a disadvantaged group (e.g. Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). For this reason, a third ‘(pro-)feminist’ category was provided to capture more explicitly social change orientations toward gender relations.¹

Hypotheses. Although the primary focus of this study is on within-sex relationships involving identification and ideology, it is also of interest to compare men and women on these variables. We expected, based on findings indicating that gender is a more important ‘identity marker’ for women than for men (see Hurtig & Pichevin, 1990; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991), that the average social identification of females would be greater than that of males.

On the basis of research indicating a positive relationship between women’s feminist consciousness and the chronic psychological salience of gender (Gurin & Markus, 1989), it was predicted that the cognitive centrality of gender would be greater for women identifying themselves as non-traditional or feminist than for traditional women. In view of findings that traditional women also can identify strongly with their gender (Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994; Condor, 1986), it was expected that other dimensions of identification (e.g. perceptions of belonging and similarity) would be less related to the traditional/non-traditional/feminist distinction. We expected that for men, endorsement of a non-traditional ideology would be associated with weaker group identification; this is consistent with the notion that high-status group members will tend to distance themselves

¹Several limitations of the traditional/non-traditional/feminist scheme of categorization should be acknowledged. Because the categories were not generated spontaneously by, nor defined for, the participants in this study, they do not reflect the full range of possible gender-relevant self-identifications, and do not necessarily hold the same meaning for all participants. A non-traditional self-categorization, for example, might reflect particularly diverse beliefs, and include those women who have moderately feminist views but who eschew the ‘feminist’ label (i.e. ‘I’m not a feminist but . . .’; Griffin, 1989). However, it is this political specificity that was intended to be captured by the feminist category, notwithstanding the diversity of feminist beliefs themselves (see Henley, Meng, O’Brien, McCarthy, & Sockloskie, 1998). We emphasize, then, that although the categories used in this study provide a convenient and theoretically relevant comparative framework, they do not necessarily reflect fixed sets of beliefs, nor are they invested with an equivalent psychological meaning for all participants.
psychologically from the in-group if they reject the legitimacy of traditional intergroup arrangements (Tajfel, 1978; Thomas, 1990).

An additional set of hypotheses concerns the possibility that the relationships between identification and gender-related attitudes and beliefs differ for various categories of women and men. In general, and based on Gurin and Markus (1989), it was predicted that identification and ideology would be more strongly related for self-identified non-traditional and feminist women than for traditional women. Conversely, based on the assumption that group attachment is more closely linked to gender-related beliefs for those men who wish to preserve the status quo, the relationship between identification and ideology was expected to be greater for traditional men than for non-traditional men.

Method

Participants

The sample comprised 262 university students (171 women and 91 men, mean age = 21.19 years). The racial and ethnic composition of the sample was not assessed, but in similar studies at the same university approximately two-thirds of the respondents identified themselves as White. Women were asked to identify themselves as traditional (N = 37), non-traditional (N = 110) or feminist (N = 22), whereas men could categorize themselves as traditional (N = 30), non-traditional (N = 57) or pro-feminist (N = 3). Two women and one man did not indicate any category.

Procedure

Questionnaires including the measures of social identification and gender-related ideology were distributed in undergraduate psychology and geography classes, and completed copies were returned to the course directors or to the researchers. Items were arranged in a random order. Response options for all items ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Although subsequent in-class debriefing was not possible, participants desiring information about the study were asked to provide their address on the last page of the questionnaire, or to contact the first author.

Measures

Social identification. A 28-item scale was constructed to assess gender-derived social identification; 17 items were positively phrased and 11 items were negatively phrased. Items were generated to reflect ties to the group, perceived similarity to other group members, affective associations with group membership and the cognitive centrality of gender (Gurin & Markus, 1989). Two items were adapted from Brown et al.’s (1986) social identification scale and one additional item was adapted from Hinkle et al.’s (1989) measure. Seven items were adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale. Because Luhtanen and Crocker’s instrument was constructed to tap global collective self-esteem, only two of the four subscales are readily adaptable to gender: the Identity subscale, which refers to the importance of group membership to self-definition, and the Private subscale, which reflects the affective evaluation of group membership. Responses were averaged such that higher scores indicate greater identification.

Sex-role ideology. A 15-item version of the AWS was included as a measure of beliefs regarding ‘the rights, roles, and privileges women ought to have or be permitted’ (Spence & Helmreich, 1978, p. 39). Responses on a 6-point scale were averaged such that higher scores reflect more non-traditional (egalitarian) beliefs (α = .81).
Perception of women’s social disadvantage. This 10-item scale (Lalonde, Schuller, & Korn, 1991) reflects beliefs regarding the status of women (e.g. ‘Women are in an inferior social position much like certain visible minority groups’). Responses were averaged such that higher scores indicate a perception that women belong to a disadvantaged group ($a = .79$).

Self-categorization. On the last page of the questionnaire, participants were asked to identify themselves as either traditional, non-traditional or (pro-)feminist (i.e. ‘Please indicate which one you would use to describe yourself’).

Results

Factor analysis

To investigate the dimensionality of the social identification items, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted for the entire sample. Principal components analysis revealed that seven factors, accounting for 59.9% of the variance, had eigenvalues greater than 1.00; the Kaiser–Guttman rule, however, tends to overestimate the number of factors (Gorsuch, 1983). Moreover, examination of the scree plot suggested a four-factor solution, which accounted for 47.9% of the variance (23.4%, 10.9%, 8.4% and 5.2% for the respective factors). Oblique rotation was considered appropriate in light of previous research suggesting a correlated factor pattern (see Hinkle et al., 1989), but orthogonal rotation produced highly similar results. All items and associated factor loadings can be obtained from the authors.

Items were considered potential subscale members if they loaded above .40 on a single factor; accordingly, four items were not sufficiently correlated with any factors, and three items loaded on more than one factor. Factors were interpreted as reflecting the following components of identification: (1) in-group ties (i.e. perceived similarity and bond; e.g. ‘I don’t have a lot in common with other women’); (2) cognitive centrality (e.g. ‘I often think about the fact that I am a man’); (3) in-group affect (i.e. positive or negative feelings associated with group membership; e.g. ‘My gender is often a source of positive feelings for me’); and (4) importance to self-definition (e.g. ‘Overall, being a woman has very little to do with how I feel about myself’; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). The internal consistencies of the subscales suggested by this factor structure were adequate for in-group ties (seven items; $a = .82$ for males; $a = .83$ for females), cognitive centrality (three items; $a = .62$ for males and $a = .77$ for females; a fourth item was relatively poorly correlated with subscale scores for both males and females) and in-group affect (seven items, $a = .81$ for both males and females). The three items defining the importance factor were sufficiently reliable for males ($a = .65$), but not for females ($a = .36$); thus, this subscale is not considered in subsequent analyses.

In summary, results of the principal components and reliability analyses support the viability of three identification subscales: in-group ties, cognitive centrality and in-group affect. Factor correlations indicated a moderate association between in-group ties and in-group affect ($r = .29$), whereas cognitive centrality was more

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2 Factor analyses performed separately by sex indicated that these four factors were particularly evident for females. The four-factor solution for males had clusters defined by in-group ties and cognitive centrality (the latter included the importance to self-definition items), whereas items reflecting positive vs. negative affect separated into distinct factors.
independent of the other dimensions (rs = .13 and .02 for in-group ties and in-group affect, respectively). A total identification score (α = .83 for males, α = .80 for females) was created by averaging responses to the 17 items in the three subscales.

**Gender differences**

A between-subjects MANOVA was performed on the two measures of gender-related beliefs, yielding a significant overall effect of sex (F(2,258) = 19.13, p < .001). Univariate tests were evaluated using a Bonferroni-type adjustment of alpha levels to control for the number of comparisons (α = .025 in this case; see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In accordance with other research using the AWS (e.g. Spence & Hahn, 1997), women (M = 5.20, SD = .53) had more egalitarian beliefs about sex roles than did men (M = 4.71, SD = .83; F(1,259) = 14.14, p < .001). Similarly, females (M = 4.08, SD = .78) believed more strongly than males (M = 3.73, SD = .76) that women belong to a disadvantaged group (F(1,259) = 6.97, p = .001).

As expected, women’s total identification scores (M = 4.56, SD = .60) were significantly greater than men’s (M = 4.34, SD = .66; t(258) = 2.74, p < .01). A second MANOVA was performed on the three identification subscales to examine gender differences in more detail (adjusted α = .016), and yielded the anticipated multivariate effect of sex (F(3,256) = 3.82, p < .05). Univariate tests revealed that women (M = 4.51, SD = .88) reported stronger in-group ties than men (M = 4.18, SD = .94; F(1,258) = 7.82, p < .01), and that gender was more cognitively central for women (M = 3.29, SD = 1.18) than for men (M = 2.98, SD = 1.11; F(1,258) = 4.26, p < .05), although the latter effect is non-significant at the adjusted alpha level. Affect associated with sex-category membership was reported as equally positive by women (M = 5.17, SD = .74) and men (M = 5.10, SD = .79; F(1,258) = .50, n.s.).

**Differences between self-categories for women**

The primary hypotheses of this study centre on within-sex categories that are defined by participants’ self-identifications as traditional, non-traditional or feminist. Mean responses on the two measures of gender-related ideology lend some meaning to the categories in this context. For women, a between-subjects MANOVA on the indexes of gender-related ideology indicated a significant multivariate effect (using Wilks’ lambda) of category (F(4,328) = 11.28, p < .001). Univariate tests (with α set at .025) yielded significant between-category differences on both the AWS (F(2,165) = 14.27, p < .001) and the measure of perceptions of women’s disadvantage (F(2,165) = 13.11, p < .001). The Tukey–Kramer test (which is appropriate for comparisons involving unequal Ns; Kirk, 1982) indicated that both non-traditional and feminist women had more egalitarian sex-role beliefs, as reflected by the AWS, than traditional women (p < .05), but were not significantly

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3Given the unequal Ns involved in many of the comparisons throughout the analyses, all were examined for departures from homogeneity of variance. None, however, was severe enough to warrant reinterpretation of effect significance (F_max, or maximum variance/minimum variance, was in all cases < 3.00; see Keppel, 1991).
different from each other on this dimension (see Table 1). Furthermore, self-identified feminist women perceived that women belong to a disadvantaged group to a greater extent than both traditional and non-traditional women, with the latter categories indistinguishable. These data thus provide evidence for the general validity of the categories for women in this study, although they must be distinguished along (at least) two dimensions.

One-way ANOVA indicated significant differences among traditional, non-traditional and feminist women on the total identification scale ($F(2,165) = 4.04, p < .02$). A Tukey–Kramer test showed that non-traditional and feminist women identified more strongly overall than traditional women (see Table 1). MANOVA also indicated a significant relationship between the categories and the combined identification subscales, evaluated using Wilks’ criterion ($F(6,326) = 5.91, p < .001$). Univariate analyses by identification subscale ($\alpha = .016$) indicated that the categories differed only with respect to the cognitive centrality of gender ($F(2,165) = 16.91, p < .001$). Comparisons of means showed that feminist women reported a significantly higher degree of cognitive centrality of gender than did non-traditional women, who in turn had significantly higher scores than traditional women ($p < .05$). The categories were not distinguishable with respect to the positivity of affect associated with gender, or the perception of in-group ties.

**Differences between self-categories for men**

Given the small number of self-identified pro-feminist men, subsequent analyses involve only the traditional and non-traditional categories. MANOVA indicated that men in these categories differed significantly on the combined measures of gender-related beliefs ($F(2,84) = 14.06, p < .001$). Non-traditional men expressed significantly more egalitarian sex-role views than traditional men ($F(1,85) = 26.86, p < .001$) (see Table 2). These categories did not differ, however, with respect to their perception of women’s disadvantaged status ($F(1,85) = 1.14, n.s.$).
As expected, traditional men tended to have higher total identification scores than non-traditional men \((t(84)=1.94, p<.06)\), a difference that was more reliable when the discrepancy between the group variances was taken into account \((t(79)=2.23, p<.03)\). MANOVA indicated, accordingly, a significant multivariate relationship between the traditional/non-traditional distinction and the social identification subscales \((F(3,82)=3.81, p<.02)\). Univariate tests showed that traditional men tended to report more positive affect associated with gender \((F(1,84)=5.60, p<.02)\) and perceived greater in-group ties \((F(1,84)=2.26, p<.03)\) than their non-traditional counterparts. Each of these effects, however, was only marginally reliable in the context of the criterion for significance \((\alpha=.016)\), adjusted to compensate for multiple tests.

### Within-category relationships between identification and ideology

It was predicted, in general, that relationships between gender-derived social identification and gender-related ideology would be stronger for self-identified non-traditional and feminist women than for traditional women and, conversely, stronger for traditional men than for non-traditional men. Correlations between the identification variables, sex-role ideology (as assessed by the AWS) and perceptions of women’s disadvantage are presented in Table 3 for women and in Table 4 for men. To explore further the extent to which various facets of identification are uniquely and collectively predictive of gender-related ideology, parallel regression analyses—in which the effects of in-group ties, cognitive centrality and in-group affect were tested simultaneously—were conducted for each category of women and men. Values of \(R^2\) were adjusted for sample size (spuriously negative adjusted values are reported as equal to 0, as recommended by Cohen and Cohen, 1983).

For women, sex-role ideology was significantly related to the identification measures only for self-categorized feminists. Specifically, the perception of strong ties with the in-group and higher levels of cognitive centrality of gender were associated with more egalitarian views, although multiple regression indicated that in-group ties was the only unique predictor \((B = .35, t(17) = 2.28, p < .05)\).
overall regression of AWS scores on the identification components was significant for feminist women ($F(3,17) = 4.04, p < .03, R^2 = .42$, adjusted $R^2 = .31$), but not for traditional women ($F(3,33) = 1.25$, n.s., $R^2 = .10$, adjusted $R^2 = .02$) or for non-traditional women ($F(3,106) = 2.32$, n.s., $R^2 = .06$, adjusted $R^2 = .04$). No individual component of identification was a significant predictor of sex-role ideology for the latter two categories.

Perceptions of women’s disadvantage were significantly correlated with the cognitive centrality of gender only for non-traditional and feminist women. In addition, for the non-traditional category, such perceptions were negatively related to the in-group affect subscale; that is, more negative gender-derived feelings were associated with a perception of greater social disadvantage. Regressions of perceptions of women’s status on the identification variables indicated a similar pattern. That is, the equations were significant for non-traditional women ($F(3,106) = 9.04, p < .001, R^2 = .20$, adjusted $R^2 = .18$) and for feminist women ($F(3,17) = 4.48, p < .02, R^2 = .44$, adjusted $R^2 = .34$), but not for traditional women ($F(3,33) = .81$, n.s., $R^2 = .07$, adjusted $R^2 = 0$). For the non-traditional category, perceptions of women’s disadvantage were significantly predicted by in-group ties ($B = .22, t(106) = 2.67, p < .01$), cognitive centrality ($B = .19, t(106) = 2.94, p < .01$)

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**Table 3. Correlations between identification variables and gender-related ideology for women**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional women ($N = 37$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Total identification</td>
<td>$-.81^{**}$</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>$.77^{**}$</td>
<td>$-.03$</td>
<td>.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. In-group ties</td>
<td>$-0.05$</td>
<td>$.42^{**}$</td>
<td>$-.06$</td>
<td>.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Cognitive centrality</td>
<td>$-.12$</td>
<td>$.28$</td>
<td>.21</td>
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<td>4. In-group affect</td>
<td>$-.18$</td>
<td>$.20$</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>5. Attitudes Toward Women Scale</td>
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<td>6. Perception of women’s disadvantage</td>
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<td>Non-traditional women ($N = 110$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Total identification</td>
<td>$.87^{**}$</td>
<td>$.27^{**}$</td>
<td>$.74^{**}$</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. In-group ties</td>
<td>$-0.02$</td>
<td>$.46^{**}$</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Cognitive centrality</td>
<td>$-.12$</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>$.31^{**}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. In-group affect</td>
<td>$-.01$</td>
<td>$.27^{*}$</td>
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<td>5. Attitudes Toward Women Scale</td>
<td></td>
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<td>$.32^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Perception of women’s disadvantage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist women ($N = 21$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Total identification</td>
<td>$.78^{**}$</td>
<td>$.45^{*}$</td>
<td>$.76^{**}$</td>
<td>$.56^{**}$</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In-group ties</td>
<td>$.30$</td>
<td>$.29$</td>
<td>$.58^{**}$</td>
<td>$-.03$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cognitive centrality</td>
<td>$-.01$</td>
<td>$.44^{*}$</td>
<td>$.60^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. In-group affect</td>
<td></td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Attitudes Toward Women Scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$.29$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Perception of women’s disadvantage</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01.
and, inversely, by in-group affect \( (B = -0.40, t(106) = -3.65, p < 0.001) \). For feminist women, cognitive centrality was the sole significant predictor of perceptions of women’s disadvantage \( (B = 0.35, t(17) = 3.63, p < 0.01) \).

Sex-role beliefs were largely unrelated to the social identification of both traditional and non-traditional men. The regression equations for the prediction of AWS scores were non-significant for both groups (respectively, \( F(3, 25) = 0.22, \text{n.s.}, R^2 = 0.03, \text{adjusted } R^2 = 0 \), and \( F(3, 53) = 1.05, \text{n.s.}, R^2 = 0.06, \text{adjusted } R^2 = 0 \)). The perception of women’s disadvantage was unrelated to non-traditional men’s levels of identification, but was negatively correlated with the total identification and in-group ties of traditional men. In other words, strongly identified traditional men, and particularly those reporting greater ties with other males, tended not to believe that women constitute a disadvantaged group. Again, however, regressions of this variable on the identification subscales accounted for very little variance for either traditional men \( (F(3, 25) = 1.46, \text{n.s.}, R^2 = 0.15, \text{adjusted } R^2 = 0) \) or non-traditional men \( (F(3, 53) = 0.06, \text{n.s.}, R^2 = 0) \).

### Discussion

The link between identity and ideology is fundamental to both feminist theory and social-psychological perspectives on social change. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) in particular offers a framework for conceptualizing the ‘group in the individual’ (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 17) as well as the psychological mechanisms underlying collective behaviour. However, the usefulness of social identity theory as an approach to gender relations has been hampered by a somewhat impoverished
conception of social identity itself, as well as an insufficient consideration of the ideological meaning of identification. For example, although it is generally recognized that power relations should be central to any intergroup analysis of gender (e.g. Amancio, 1989; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988), individual orientations toward structural inequality are often not taken into account. Of course, this criticism does not apply to all studies; for example, there is a tradition of research on the social identity of women that has paid close attention to the content and ideological correlates of gender-related identity (e.g. Skevington & Baker, 1989). The aim of the present study was threefold: (1) to explore the viability of a multidimensional view of gender-related identity; (2) to clarify the nature of the relationship between social identity and gender-related ideology; and (3) to investigate these relationships in men, as well as women.

The nature of social identification

The results suggest that gender-derived social identification can be meaningfully conceptualized along (at least) three dimensions: in-group ties, cognitive centrality and in-group affect. The items of the affective dimension overlap considerably with private collective self-esteem, as operationalized by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992). With the exception of this emotional, or evaluative, component, these dimensions are similar to two of those specified by Gurin and Townsend (1986): perceived similarity (one aspect of ‘in-group ties’) and cognitive centrality. The three factors, of course, do not represent all possible aspects of gender-related social identification; indeed, Gurin and Townsend’s results suggest that the perception of common fate may be an important correlate of group consciousness (see also Deaux, 1996).

The present scale differs somewhat from other attempts, in the social identity literature, to represent three factors of identification based on awareness of membership, emotional associations of membership, and evaluative facets of identity (cf. Tajfel, 1978; see Brown et al., 1986; Hinkle et al., 1989). One concern with this model is that any distinctions between ‘evaluation’ and ‘emotion’ need to be defined carefully. Moreover, whereas Brown et al.’s (1986) measure is appropriate for assessing identification in a wide variety of groups, including those that are ad hoc in nature, it may not fully capture aspects of identification that are particularly relevant to more enduring social identities, such as gender and ethnic group memberships. For example, the concept of the centrality of identity is particularly useful as an index of the extent to which group membership is chronically salient for an individual (Gurin & Townsend, 1986), although it is less applicable to a more minimal intergroup context. At any rate, given that various components of social identity are of potential theoretical significance, a scale that reliably differentiates them will be a valuable tool for future research. Indeed, more recent work has demonstrated that the tripartite conception of identification considered here generalizes to other group memberships, including ethnic, national and university-derived identification (Cameron, 2000; Cameron, Sato, Lalonde, & Lay, 1997).

The social identity of women

Consistent with the view that membership in a lower-status ‘minority’ group enhances social identification, women’s perceived bond with other group members,
and cognitive centrality of gender, tended to be greater than men’s. There were also differences between self-identified traditional, non-traditional and feminist women; these, however, were attributable only to the cognitive centrality of gender. That is, for the feminist category, gender was highly central, whereas it was less central for non-traditional women and less, in turn, for traditional women. It is also noteworthy that scores on the in-group affect subscale were very positive for both women and men, contrary to the notion that women, as members of the lower-status group, will tend to derive a relatively negative social identity from their sex-category membership (e.g. Hogg & Turner, 1987). Furthermore, there were no differences between self-categorized traditional, non-traditional and feminist women on this dimension, providing no basis for the assumption that women who ‘accept’ their subordinate status will perceive their group—and by implication, their selves—in unfavourable terms (see Condor, 1986).

Results of between-category contrasts on the measures of gender-related ideology suggest that the feminist self-identification entailed a belief in the illegitimacy of the intergroup status relationship (i.e. the view that women are disadvantaged relative to men), whereas the choice of the non-traditional category in this context indicated a dissatisfaction with traditional sex roles without a concomitant belief that further social change is necessary. A prevailing assumption in theoretical accounts of the social identity of women is that psychological attachment to the group will be greater for those women who reject the status quo; indeed, it is not possible to dismiss the theoretical link between feminist consciousness and group identification, given that ‘collective discontent requires a categorical, intergroup focus’ (Gurin & Townsend, 1986, p. 146). The present results show that this relationship is clearly manifested in the cognitive centrality of gender, whereas other dimensions of identification (i.e. in-group ties, in-group affect) are not associated with women’s self-identifications as traditional, non-traditional or feminist. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the components of identification have different ideological meanings for different groups of women (cf. Gurin & Markus, 1989). These differences were evident in the correlational analyses involving the measures of sex-role ideology and the perception of women’s disadvantage.

It was expected that social identification would be more strongly associated with gender-related ideology for non-traditional and feminist women than for traditional women. In general, there was support for this hypotheses; in fact, there were no significant relationships involving identity and ideology for self-identified traditional women. Only for the feminist category were both sex-role ideology and the perception of women’s disadvantage strongly related to aspects of identity (in-group ties and cognitive centrality, respectively). The cognitive centrality of gender was also a significant predictor of perceptions of group disadvantage for women identifying themselves as non-traditional. Again, and in agreement with Gurin and Markus (1989), these results demonstrate that the cognitive centrality of gender is a crucial feature of identity in women eschewing a traditional orientation to gender relations. There were some unforeseen differences, however, between categories of women identifying themselves as non-traditional vs. feminist. First, the regression analyses indicated that, whereas cognitive centrality was the only
significant predictor of perception of group status for feminist women, all three dimensions of identification were implicated for non-traditional women. Secondly, for the non-traditional category, responses to the in-group affect subscale were negatively associated with perceptions of the status of women. Thus, an awareness of women’s social disadvantage was associated with more negative feelings associated with group membership. Although causal links cannot be determined here, one possibility consistent with social identity theory is that group evaluation plays a role in the early stages of feminist consciousness, such that negative collective self-esteem motivates a categorical interpretation of gender relations.

In summary, the present results are consistent with other research indicating that women’s social identity is indeed an important feature of feminist identity and a predictor of group ideology (e.g. Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995); however, the extent to which identity is predictive of ideology depends upon both the specific component of identification (Gurin & Markus, 1989; Gurin & Townsend, 1986), as well as the subgroup in which an individual self-categorizes. The variable strength of these effects is noteworthy: the components of identification accounted for over 30% of the variability in both indices of feminist women’s gender-related ideology, compared with less than 20% for non-traditional women, and less than 10% for traditional women.

The social identity of men

Are men unconcerned with gender? On average, men reported weaker in-group ties, and less cognitive centrality of gender, than women. Furthermore, the present findings indicated that men’s gender-related identities bear relatively weak relationships with their sex-role ideology and their perceptions of women’s status. This is consistent with other work suggesting that, as dominant group members, men tend to be ‘less concerned than women with the domain of gender stereotypes’ (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991, p. 414). However, two caveats are worth noting. First, if men’s self-reported attitudes are weakly related to their social identification, this is not to say that their behaviour is not tied to identity, particularly given contextual variations in the salience of group membership and normative influences on behaviour (e.g. see Burian, Yanico, & Martinez, 1998). For example, perceived situational norms, or simply the presence of other group members, might exert a powerful influence on gender-relevant behaviour of men, as well as women. Secondly, the present results do not necessarily suggest that gender-related identity is unimportant to men; indeed, there is evidence that men’s psychological well-being, to a greater extent than women’s, is tied to group-based notions of appropriate behaviour (e.g. Burris, Branscombe, & Klar, 1997; O’Neil, Good, & Holmes, 1995). In this context, it is interesting to note that men who identified themselves as non-traditional tended to report not only weaker ties to the group, but less positive group-derived feelings, than traditional men; this suggests that ‘being a man’ is a less desirable identity for the former subgroup. Thus, even if men’s identification is only weakly or inconsistently related to attitudes toward the roles and status of women, it is problematic, from the perspective of social change, if men cannot achieve satisfactory alternatives to a ‘traditional’ male identity.
Whereas identification as a feminist is an option for women, there is no accessible, or perhaps normatively acceptable, analogue for most men. An additional consideration is that with an increasing political awareness of gender, men are confronted with a negative group image that casts them as perpetrators (or at least beneficiaries) of oppressive social relations (Thomas, 1990). Future research, then, might usefully integrate a multidimensional view of men’s social identification with existing perspectives on the ambivalence of masculinity and male identity (e.g. Pleck, 1981, 1995).

Conclusions

Much research in the tradition of social identity theory is subject to the criticism that it prioritizes intergroup process at the expense of neglecting the content of particular social identities (e.g. Michael, 1990; Schiffmann & Wicklund, 1992). That the assessment of individual differences in identification has become commonplace, however, signifies a shift toward the recognition of the psychological meaning of group membership. In the case of gender, it is clear that a simple male–female distinction does not capture the complexities of gender-related self-conception and ideology. Women and men, rather than being undifferentiated members of their sexes, have various degrees of psychological and emotional investment in group membership, and possess beliefs that give shape to the meaning of their identification. Thus, the present study adds weight to the argument that social identity-relevant processes will not necessarily be exhibited by all group members, or even by all groups (Brown et al., 1992; Brown & Williams, 1984; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). This may be a particularly relevant consideration in the context of gender, given the breadth of the male and female categories, as well as their salient interpersonal features. Future research might profitably focus, then, on the ways that gender-related identity is meaningfully structured by subcategories that may be more or less ideological relevant (e.g. Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994). Of course, the everyday psychological and behavioural relevance of these categories will be more fluid than the relationships implied by the present data. Furthermore, the use by researchers of such categories as ‘feminist’ is not unproblematic, given that they may be imbued with shifting and variable meanings (Condor, 1989; Griffin, 1989); however, the present results suggest that as self-identifications, they are of both psychological and theoretical significance. If social identity theory is to provide a relevant account of social change, then the ‘content’ of such identities must be regarded as a matter of some importance.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a doctoral fellowship to the first author from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Preparation of the article was facilitated by a University of Queensland Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. Portions of the data were presented at the meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association in June 1994. We thank Clarry Lay, Regina Schuller, Julie Duck, Kim Matheson and Scott Reid for their helpful comments.
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Received 5 July 1998; revised version received 2 June 2000